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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White,1 the Supreme Court defined the scope of employer conduct that
violates the retaliation provision embedded in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 The Court’s definition is broad enough to
encompass the retaliatory harassment claim recognized by numerous
courts.3 Retaliatory harassment subjects an employer to liability when its
employee encounters a hostile work environment (“HWE”) in retaliation
for engaging in protected activity. While, prior to Burlington Northern,
some courts have refused to recognize retaliatory harassment, no court
has fully explored the practical consequences of this claim on American
employers. This comment reviews the scope of employer liability for
retaliatory harassment and the impediments an employer may face in
attempting to avoid such liability.
Congress passed Title VII to combat discriminatory employment
practices.4 Title VII consists of two provisions: the main discrimination
provision that proscribes “discrimination” against an employee because
of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and the retaliation
provision that proscribes “discrimination” against an employee because
she accused her employer of violating a Title VII provision.5 The
Supreme Court construed the term “discrimination” under the main
discrimination provision to prohibit tangible practices, such as hiring,
firing or failing to promote, and intangible practices, whereby an
employee’s co-workers or supervisors expose her to a HWE because of
her protected characteristic.6 However, prior to Burlington Northern, the
1

126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-15 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (adopting the definition of retaliatory
conduct relied upon by the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, which both
recognize retaliatory harassment).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), -3(a) (2006).
5
§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a).
6
Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
2
3
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Supreme Court had provided little guidance on the meaning of
“discrimination” under the retaliation provision, causing circuits to adopt
one of three definitions.7
The narrow-view circuits decided that “discrimination” in the
retaliation context refers only to ultimate employment decisions that
produce “tangible change[s] in duties or working conditions” and result
in “material employment disadvantage[s].” 8 By contrast, the broad-view
circuits held that “discrimination” includes any adverse actions
reasonably likely to discourage employees from participating in
protected activities.9 In the middle of these two standards were the
moderate circuits that defined “discrimination” as ultimate employment
decisions and other decisions that materially affect employment
privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.10 In Burlington Northern,
the Supreme Court adopted the broad-view circuits’ definition.11 Based
on these definitions, the broad-view and moderate-view circuits
recognized retaliatory harassment as actionable discrimination.12
The broad-view circuits justified their position on the grounds that
retaliatory harassment is reasonably likely to discourage an employee
from participating in protected expression.13 The moderate-view circuits
reasoned that retaliatory harassment could materially affect employment
privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.14 These courts combined
the law developed under the retaliation provision with the HWE law
developed under the main discrimination provision to adjudicate
retaliatory harassment claims. The narrow-view courts rejected the
retaliatory harassment claim on the grounds that it can never constitute
an ultimate employment decision.15 Because Burlington Northern has
embraced the broad-view circuits’ approach, all courts must now
7

Cathy Currie, Case Note, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A Criticism of
the Court’s Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the Retaliation Provision of
Title VII in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000), 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1323,
1333 (2002).
8
See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
9
See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
“discrimination” includes refusals to promote, undesirable transfers and assignments, bad
references and “toleration of harassment by other employees”).
10
See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Ross v. Commc’n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985)) (holding that
limiting employee’s job responsibilities, refusing to give her “a performance review and
annual salary and benefit increases” and giving references based on false information can
constitute adverse employment actions).
11
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
12
See infra Part V.B-C.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See infra Part V.A.
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recognize retaliatory harassment. However, Burlington Northern does
not require courts to rely on HWE harassment law in adjudicating
retaliatory harassment claims.
This comment addresses the confusion that results when courts use
HWE harassment law from the main discrimination provision to
adjudicate retaliatory harassment claims and the practical effects of this
approach on employers’ ability to assess and prevent liability. Part II of
this comment describes Title VII’s main provisions. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of “discrimination” under the main
discrimination provision, the development of HWE law and the circuit
courts’ divergent interpretations of the HWE standard. Part IV explains
the circuit courts’ conflicting definitions of “discrimination” under the
retaliation provision and the Supreme Court’s attempt to resolve the
conflict in Burlington Northern. Part V discusses the broad-view and
moderate-view circuits’ use of HWE law to create a new breed of
retaliatory harassment claims. Part VI argues that this approach to
adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims makes it extremely difficult
for employers to avoid liability and allows plaintiffs with weak HWE
claims to bypass HWE requirements and still recover damages. Finally,
this comment suggests that, rather than continue to import HWE
harassment law into the retaliation provision, lower courts should
develop a new standard for adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims.
II. TITLE VII GENERALLY
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
primarily to effect a national commitment to ending racial discrimination
in employment.16 However, Congress extended Title VII to proscribe
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion and national
origin.17 The Act’s ban on sex discrimination was attached as “an
eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill.”18
16

See WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH ET AL., ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 7152, H.R. REP.
NO. 88-914, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513-16. In this excerpt, several
members of Congress explain the great inequality in employment that African Americans
experienced in the 1960s. Id. at 2513. African American communities incurred much
larger unemployment percentages than white communities, and African American
citizens were “largely concentrated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations.”
Id. Congress recognized that employers’ disparate treatment of African Americans
stigmatized them and undermined their “incentive to strive for excellence in employment
and education.” Id. at 2514; see S. REP. NO. 88-872, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2362-63. The background note describes that in 1960, the major political parties
committed themselves to “a program of equal opportunity and elimination of racial
discrimination.” Id. at 2362.
17
S. REP. NO. 88-872, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356.
18
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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“Although Title VII seeks ‘to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,’ its
‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”19 To that end, Title
VII encourages employers to take reasonable measures to prevent
employment discrimination, including advising employees of their rights
under Title VII and establishing complaint procedures for discrimination
victims.20 Title VII also provides for the creation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a federal agency
charged with enforcing the Act.21
Title VII’s main discrimination provision, section 703(a), makes it
unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22

Additionally, Title VII’s retaliation provision, section 704(a), prohibits
an employer from
discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this title . . . or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.23

Section 703(a) and section 704(a) both proscribe “discrimination,”
but it is not clear from the Statute’s text which employer acts constitute
“discrimination.”24
The
Supreme
Court’s
interpretation
of
19

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
See id.
21
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006); see United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov.
22
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
23
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
24
Donna Smith Cude & Brian Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?,
14 LAB. LAW. 373, 396-97 (1998). Cude and Steger write:
20
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“discrimination” under section 703(a) is vague in numerous respects.25
Consequently, lower courts disagree on key issues concerning section
703(a) discrimination.26 Courts also disagree on various issues
concerning section 704(a) discrimination, such as what kind of activity is
protected from retaliation and what is the required connection between
the protected activity and the employer’s discriminatory action.27 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern did not resolve these
issues; the Court only described employer reactions to protected activity
that could constitute retaliation.28 When lower courts combine their
interpretations of discrimination under section 703(a) with their
interpretations of section 704(a) to adjudicate retaliatory harassment
claims, they pile circuit splits on top of circuit splits. This approach
leaves employers confused about the measures they must take to prevent
liability.
III. WHAT IT MEANS TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER THE MAIN
DISCRIMINATION PROVISION
The main discrimination provision proscribes employment policies
that have a “disparate impact” on protected individuals or groups, and
“disparate treatment” of protected individuals or groups.29 A disparateimpact claim typically entails a facially neutral policy that produces an
adverse effect on a protected class.30 The policy may expose an employer
to liability if he cannot justify it as being necessary for business.31 To
prevail on a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff does not need to prove a
causal link between the employer’s policy and her protected
characteristic.32

It is undisputed that the word “discriminate” means “to make a
difference in treatment or favor.” In the legal context, the word ‘against’ is
defined as “adverse to.” Thus, it logically follows that by prohibiting
“discrimination against” employees, Section 704(a) forbids employers from
adversely treating employees for engaging in protected activity. The degree
of harm necessary to trigger Section 704(a)’s protection is, however, unclear
from the statute.
Id.

25

Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 502 (1991).
26
See infra Part III.B.
27
See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
28
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
29
1 MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 182-256 (3d ed. 2004).
30
MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: IN A
NUTSHELL 111-13 (5th ed. 2004).
31
Id.
32
Id.
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A disparate treatment claim can be based on a tangible
discriminatory practice that “constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.”33 Alternatively, it can be based
on an intangible discriminatory practice that creates “‘a working
environment heavily charged with . . . discrimination.’”34 Both
discrimination forms require proof of a causal link between the
employer’s action and the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.35
In tangible discrimination cases, the plaintiff can prove causation
by showing her employer acted with discriminatory intent.36 The plaintiff
can proffer direct37 or circumstantial38 discriminatory intent evidence. If
the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, she must establish that: (1)
she belongs to a class protected under Title VII; (2) she qualified for the
job, promotion or benefit at issue; and (3) the job, promotion or benefit
“either remained open or was instead given to a person who is a member
of a different class.”39 Subsequently, the burden shifts to the employer to
establish a nondiscriminatory justification for its action.40 If the employer
meets its burden, the plaintiff will have to prove that the employer’s
justification is really a pretext for discrimination.41
33

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); see ROBERT N.
COVINGTON & KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 220 (2d ed. 2002)
(discussing the two forms of tangible employment actions).
34
COVINGTON & DECKER, supra note 33, at 220 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B.
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)).
35
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 246.
36
David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1710 (2002).
37
MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 90, 92-93 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining that this proposition was
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); see also ROTHSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 29, at 191-93. Rothstein writes that direct evidence consists of
statements demonstrating the decision-maker’s bias toward a protected characteristic. Id.
Rothstein cites the following remarks that courts accepted as direct evidence of
discriminatory intent: “calling an employee a ‘damn woman’ for gender discrimination;
telling an employee that she ‘needed a good Christian boyfriend to teach her to be
submissive’ for religious discrimination; . . . and calling an employee a ‘black radical’
who would stir up racial discontent as evidence of racial discrimination.” Id. at 192-93.
38
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prescribing a
framework for proving discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence); see also
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs Bd. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (expanding on the
McDonnell Douglas framework).
39
COVINGTON & DECKER, supra note 33, at 212-13. Covington and Decker note that
circumstantial evidence of discrimination is much more common than direct evidence
because an employer seldom “publicize[s] its bias.” Id. at 212.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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A. Hostile Work Environment Discrimination
The plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on intangible
employment practices must prove causation by showing that her
employer exposed her to HWE harassment because of her protected
characteristic. In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has provided
several guidelines for pleading a prima facie HWE harassment claim.
However, the HWE precedent still contains many gaps and ambiguities
that have resulted in numerous circuit splits on the HWE standard.
The Supreme Court for the first time recognized and defined HWE
harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson..42 In Vinson, the plaintiff
brought a sexual harassment suit against her employer, the bank, alleging
that her manager groped her, exposed himself to her and had a
continuous sexual relationship with her.43 However, the employer did not
expressly promise the plaintiff employment security or other benefits in
exchange for sexual favors.44 The Supreme Court held that even though
the plaintiff’s claim did not involve tangible discrimination or economic
loss, it is still cognizable under section 703(a) as HWE harassment.45 The
Court explained that section 703(a) covers two general types of sexual
harassment: quid pro quo and HWE.46 Quid pro quo harassment is a form
of tangible discrimination, whereby a supervisor demands a sexual favor
from his employee in exchange for an employment benefit.47 HWE
harassment, on the other hand, does not involve a conditional demand for
sexual favors, but rather exists where the plaintiff’s work environment is
filled with sexually charged conduct.48 The Court then defined HWE
harassment as “‘conduct [having] the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.’”49 The Court
also held that HWE harassment is actionable only if it is unwelcome and

42
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). It is important to note
that while Vinson and its progeny address sexual harassment claims, the HWE framework
these cases establish also applies to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination. Jennie
Randall, Comment, Don’t You Say That!: Injunctions Against Speech Found to Violate
Title VII are Not Prior Restraints, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 990, 998-1003 (2001).
43
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 59-61.
44
See id.
45
Id. at 64. The Court stated that section 703(a)’s prohibition on discrimination with
regard to “‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’” refers to a wide range of
disparate treatment of women and men, not just to “‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
discrimination.” Id.
46
Id. at 65.
47
See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
48
See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)).
49
Id.
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so severe and pervasive that it changes the plaintiff’s terms and
conditions of employment.50
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,51 the Supreme Court developed
two standards for determining whether workplace discrimination is
sufficiently “‘severe or pervasive.’”52 First, the Court held that the
plaintiff must prove that a reasonable person would have perceived her
environment as hostile and abusive, and that she subjectively perceived
her environment as such.53 Second, the Court added that “whether an
environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking
at all of the circumstances.”54 Some relevant circumstances, according to
the Court, are whether the conduct threatened or humiliated the
employee or unreasonably interfered with her job performance.55
Further, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,56 the
Supreme Court explained that the Harris test requires a “careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs
and is experienced by its target.”57 The Court provided the following
example: “A professional football player’s working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on
the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior would
reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or
female) back at the office.”58 The Supreme Court also imposed a
limitation on HWE claims: they are not a means of regulating workplace
etiquette. In Oncale, the Court stated that Title VII is not intended as a
“general civility code.”59 The Court explained that by requiring
discrimination to be “because of” a protected characteristic, Title VII
precludes regulation of conduct that is not premised on a protected
characteristic.60
Last, the Supreme Court grappled with the issue of employer
liability for HWE harassment in two landmark cases: Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth61 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.62 Both cases
hold an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s harassment
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 67-69.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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culminating in a tangible employment action.63 The Ellerth Court
determined employer liability based on the “aided in the agency relation
standard.”64 The Court explained that according to this standard, an
employer is liable for his supervisor’s discrimination when the existence
of the employment relationship, i.e., the nature of the supervisor’s
authority within the company, enables the supervisor’s actions.65 The
Court reasoned that an employer is always liable for its supervisor’s
tangible employment actions, because by making someone a supervisor,
the employer gives that individual authority to hire, fire, promote,
demote or make other significant alterations in a subordinate’s
employment status.66
With respect to HWE cases, the Court held that it might be unfair to
impute vicarious liability to the employer for a supervisor’s harassment
because the agency relation does not necessarily aid the supervisor’s
conduct.67 The Court reasoned that by making one a supervisor, the
employer does not enable him to harass his subordinates.68 The Court
noted that the supervisor does not rely on his job title to harass another
employee and that he could harass even if he weren’t the supervisor.69
Thus, the Court held that an employer is liable for a supervisor’s HWE
harassment subject to an affirmative defense requiring the employer to
prove that (a) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct” the
harassment; and (b) the plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities . . . or to avoid harm
otherwise.”70 The Supreme Court never resolved the issue of employer
liability for co-worker harassment. However, the Faragher Court noted a
general agreement among circuit courts that employer liability is
governed by the negligence standard.71
B. Courts’ Divergent Interpretations of HWE Law
The vagueness of the HWE standard has engendered circuit splits
on key issues concerning its application. Lower courts vary in their
interpretations of what kind of speech rises to the “severe and pervasive”

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-62; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
Id.
See id. at 761-62.
Id. at 763.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 765.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998).
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level.72 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris and Oncale direct the
fact finder to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a plaintiff’s environment was objectively and subjectively
abusive. However, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Hathaway v. Runyon,
this standard is so vague that it leaves lower-court judges confused and
juries “‘virtually unguided’” about the bounds of employer liability.73
In Hathaway, the plaintiff was a postal service employee who
claimed that her co-worker made sexual advances toward her and groped
her rear end on two occasions.74 The plaintiff alleged that she rejected
her co-worker’s advances and that he, in response, conspired with his
friend to create a HWE by making noises when she walked by them.75
The noises were described as “a purring or growling noise made in the
throat . . . [or] a clicking of the tongue.”76 The jury awarded the plaintiff
$75,000 for her HWE claim.77 However, the district court ordered a
judgment in favor of the defendant, because the plaintiff failed to prove a
HWE that was sufficiently severe and pervasive.78 The district court
stated, with regard to the co-worker’s noises, “if that type of conduct can
rise to the level of a sexual harassment claim in this country, we’re in
deep trouble because it does go on in the workplace.”79 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and ordered that the
jury’s verdict be reinstated.80 The Eighth Circuit noted: “There is no
bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct, so
a jury’s decision must generally stand unless there is trial error.”81
Other courts have also punished offensive conduct that either goes
on in the workplace quite often or is not likely to be considered severe
and pervasive harassment by a mainstream American worker. For
instance, one Florida district court found a HWE where a work
atmosphere was filled with sexual jokes and caricatures.82 A
Massachusetts court held a worker liable for sexual harassment when he
attached a photograph of a female, who was running for union office, to
72

David E. Bernstein, Hostile Environment Law and the Threat to Freedom of
Expression in the Workplace, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
73
132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997) (reacting to the Harris test).
74
Id. at 1217.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1220.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1225.
81
Id. at 1221 (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir.
1995)).
82
Bernstein, supra note 72, at 3 (citing Cardin v. Via Tropical Fruits, Inc., No. 8814201, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16302, at *24-26 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
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the body of a Hustler centerfold and circulated it around the office.83
Another Massachusetts court found that an Iranian employee was
exposed to a HWE because a co-worker hung pictures in her cubicle of
Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranians burning the U.S. flag.84
Additionally, a Pennsylvania court held that “publishing religious articles
in a company newsletter and printing Christian-themed verses on
company paychecks constituted ‘harassment’ of a Jewish employee.”85
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris created a circuit
split concerning the application of the reasonable person standard. The
Harris Court held that the “reasonable person” standard should be used
to determine whether the victim rightfully perceived her environment as
hostile or abusive.86 However, in applying this principle, the Court
simply cited to the lower court’s analysis, which actually employed the
“reasonable woman” standard.87 Harris never resolved which standard is
best or whether the standards are interchangeable. Consequently, in the
sexual harassment context, courts are split on whether the existence of a
HWE is determined from the perspective of a reasonable person or a
reasonable woman.88
In the racial and national origin harassment contexts, some courts
have abandoned the reasonable person standard in favor of the
reasonable black person89 or the reasonable person of specific national
origin standards.90 Courts using the gender, race, or national-originspecific standards reason that protected groups perceive workplace
83
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
563, 566 (1995) (citing Bowman v. Heller, No. 90-3269, 1993 WL 761159 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1993)). In a footnote, Professor Volokh explains that the employee’s actions involved
not only pornography but also political speech about a union candidate that is at the core
of First Amendment protection. Id. at 566 n.10.
84
Id. at 565-66 (citing Pakizegi v. First Nat’l Bank, 831 F. Supp. 901, 908-09 (D.
Mass. 1993)).
85
Bernstein, supra note 72, at 5 (citing Brown Transp. Corp. v. Pa. Human Relations
Comm’n, 578 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 1990)).
86
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
87
See id. at 20.
88
Jessica M. Karner, Comment, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637, 643 (1995); see also Mary Beth Heinzelmann,
Comment, A Review of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Legal Issues, 12 LAW &
SEX 337, 341-44 (2003). In addition, see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986), for an example of the reasonable person approach, and Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991), for an example of the reasonable woman
approach.
89
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 229 (citing Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F.
Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991)). The Harris Court expressly adopted the “reasonable black
person” standard. Id.
90
Id. (citing Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002)). In Kang, the
court employed the “reasonable Korean” standard. Id.
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behavior differently from the average American.91 Implicit in this
reasoning is the assumption that application of a gender, race or nationalorigin-specific standard to a HWE claim is likely to produce different
results than the application of the reasonable person standard.92
The circuits also dispute whether it matters that the alleged
harassment occurred in a white-collar or a blue-collar environment.93
This confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Harris,
which requires courts to look to the totality of circumstances, and
Oncale, which requires courts to examine the social context of the
plaintiff’s workplace.94 Some courts hold that the nature of the plaintiff’s
work environment is relevant to whether she was harassed.95 For
example, the Tenth Circuit in Gross v. Burggraf 96 was among the first
courts to take this position. In Gross, the plaintiff was a construction-site
truck driver who brought a HWE suit against her employer because her
supervisor made several offensive statements.97 The Tenth Circuit held
that the plaintiff’s claim must be judged in the context of a blue-collar
environment.98 The court concluded that the supervisor’s speech was not
sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a HWE because in a bluecollar workplace, “crude language is commonly used by male and female
employees,” and the plaintiff admitted to personally contributing to the
“use of crude language on the job site.”99
On the other hand, courts like the Sixth Circuit in Williams v.
General Motors Corp. find the nature of plaintiff’s work environment
irrelevant to whether she was harassed.100 In Williams, the plaintiff was a
warehouse worker who alleged that she was exposed to a HWE because
91
See, e.g., Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1515-16 (explaining that black Americans
perceive racial behavior differently from white Americans).
92
See Heinzelmann, supra note 88, at 343. Opponents of the reasonable woman
standard assert that it highlights the differences in male and female viewpoints and fails
to represent the experiences of all women. Id. They argue that this test only accounts for
the dominant female group: “‘white, affluent, heterosexual women.’” Id. (quoting
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 244 (1999)).
93
Jeffrey Lyons, Comment, Be Prepared: Unsuspecting Employers are Vulnerable
for Title VII Sexual Harassment Environment Claims, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 467, 483-85
(2003).
94
Id. at 484-85.
95
Michael Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 440 (2002) (citing the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and the
District of Columbia Circuits, along with various district and state courts, as proponents
of this approach).
96
53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
97
Id. at 1535.
98
Id. at 1537-38.
99
Id. at 1537-38, 1542.
100
187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Frank, supra note 95, at 441 (citing the First
and Fourth Circuits as proponents of the Williams approach).
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her supervisor made sexual remarks toward her, other employees used
vulgar language around her, other employees treated her poorly, and she
was denied certain employment benefits.101 The Sixth Circuit stated that
it rejects “the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies
depending on the work environment” because “women working in the
trades do not deserve less protection from the law.”102 The Sixth Circuit
based its decision on equality considerations, not on the Harris and
Oncale tests.103
Because of these circuit splits an employer who wants to avoid
liability by preventing and detecting a HWE cannot effectively regulate
employee conduct. These mixed messages also fail to provide juries with
clear guidance on the bounds of employer liability.104 Consequently,
juries have awarded thousands of dollars to accusers for claims that were
later dismissed on appeal for failure to raise genuine issues of material
fact as to the employers’ guilt.105 In fact, employers often settle claims
that lack merit, because they fear losing thousands of dollars from juries’
largely subjective HWE findings.106 Although a meritless claim would
likely be overturned on appeal, few employers take the risk to find out.107
Employers would rather settle than appeal a verdict because appellate
courts apply the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to review HWE
findings.108 Litigating an appeal is not only risky, but can also cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars.109 Therefore, it makes more economic
sense for employers to settle.
IV. WHAT IT MEANS TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER THE RETALIATION
PROVISION
The retaliation provision, section 704(a), prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee, because she engaged in
activity protected by Title VII.110 Courts agree that a retaliation claim
requires proof of an employee’s protected activity, an employer’s
adverse action and a causal link between the two.111 However, the circuit
101

Id. at 559.
Id. at 564.
103
Lyons, supra note 93, at 484-85.
104
See Bernstein, supra note 72, at 3-4.
105
Id. at 4.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. (explaining that an appeals court will only overrule a jury’s HWE finding if it is
“clearly erroneous”).
109
Id.
110
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
111
Currie, supra note 7, at 1329 (explaining that most circuits have relied on this
standard since the early 1980s).
102
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courts have issued divergent opinions interpreting all three requirements;
the circuit splits have caused much confusion for employers seeking to
prevent section 704(a) liability. In Burlington Northern, the Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of adverse employment action.112 However,
the Court did not resolve the remaining section 704(a) ambiguities
concerning the scope of protected conduct and the required causal link.
A. The Retaliatory Discrimination Standard
To plead a prima facie retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) she engaged in protected expression; (2) her employer subjected
her to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal
connection between her protected act and the employer’s adverse
action.113 The causal connection can be proven by direct evidence of
retaliatory intent or by circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment.114
When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework that was developed for cases
brought under the main discrimination provision will apply.115 Thus, the
burden shifts to the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory, legitimate
justification for taking the adverse employment action.116 Then the
burden shifts again to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered
justification is just a pretext for discrimination.117
1. First Prong—Engagement in Protected Expression
The first prong requires a showing that the plaintiff engaged in
expression protected by Title VII. The language of section 704(a) refers
to two kinds of protected expression: participation in enforcing Title VII
and opposition to any practice “made an unlawful employment practice
by [Title VII].”118 Participation includes a wide variety of activities,
which include making a charge or assisting in a Title VII investigation,
hearing, or proceeding.119 Opposition is a more complex standard, which
entails communicating to the employer or another entity a belief that

112

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 221.
114
Id.
115
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Cude
& Steger, supra note 24, at 376 (noting that, although the Supreme Court articulated this
burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment cases litigated under the main
discrimination provision, most lower courts have applied it to retaliation cases).
116
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
117
Id. at 804.
118
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
119
Id.
113
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unlawful activity has taken place.120 Lower courts vary in their
interpretations of the opposition standard.
For example, lower courts disagree on whether the plaintiff must
prove that unlawful activity actually occurred. The Supreme Court
grappled with this issue in Clark County v. Breeden,121 but declined to
resolve it. In Breeden, the plaintiff met with her supervisor and a coworker to discuss the results of several job applicants’ psychological
examinations.122 One applicant’s examination declared that he made the
following statement to his co-worker: “‘I hear making love to you is like
making love to the Grand Canyon.’”123 The supervisor remarked that he
did not understand the statement and the plaintiff’s co-worker jokingly
replied that he would explain it later.124 Both men laughed. The plaintiff
perceived this conduct as sexual harassment and filed charges against her
employer.125 Subsequently, the plaintiff was transferred to a position she
did not like, so she brought the suit for retaliation.126
The Ninth Circuit held that she was protected from retaliation even
though her complaint was not based on unlawful conduct because all she
had to prove was a good faith, reasonable belief that her supervisor’s and
co-worker’s laughs were unlawful.127 The Supreme Court reversed the
decision.128 The Court declined to resolve the circuit split, but held that
no person could “reasonably believe that the incident recounted above
violated Title VII[’s standard.]”129 Since this decision, many lower courts
have held that the plaintiff does not need to prove that unlawful activity
occurred so long as she reasonably and in good faith believed that it
did.130 This reasonable belief standard is problematic for employers,
because it is vague and courts vary widely in its interpretation.131
Circuit courts are also split regarding what kind of opposition
activity section 704(a) protects.132 Opposition activity may include
refusing to follow unlawful orders or filing informal complaints, internal
120

PATRICIA WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE RETALIATION 14
(2000).
121
532 U.S. 268 (2001).
122
Id. at 269.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 271.
126
See id. at 271-72.
127
Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
opinion), rev’d, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
128
Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.
129
Id. at 270.
130
WISE, supra note 120, at 17-18.
131
Id. at 17.
132
Id. at 18-19.
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complaints, and even vague complaints.133 Courts concur that opposition
activity is protected so long as it is reasonable, but disagree on what
“reasonable” means.134 As per the EEOC regulations, courts consider
opposition unreasonable if it unduly disrupts the employer’s business or
interferes with the employee’s job performance.135 For example, in
Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., the plaintiff, an
in-house attorney, sent letters to company outsiders that described the
company’s allegedly unlawful employment practices and disclosed
confidential information protected by the attorney-client privilege.136 The
company terminated her and she brought suit.137 The plaintiff alleged that
her letters were opposition activity and that the company retaliated
against her because she sent them.138 The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s opposition activity was not protected because it was
“‘detrimental to the position of responsibility held by [her].’”139
However, some courts interpret the “unreasonableness” requirement
narrowly for fear of chilling employee activism.140 For example, some
courts have held that employees’ letters to their employers’ customers
containing damaging information constituted protected opposition, even
where the letters were not based on accurate information and unduly
disrupted the employer’s business.141 In EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., Crown’s employees wrote a letter to one of the company’s most
important customers stating that Crown engages in racist employment
practices.142 Crown terminated the employees who signed the letter on
the grounds that they were disloyal.143 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the

133

Id. at 15.
Id. at 17-18.
135
Id. at 18. Wise also explains that courts do not protect unlawful activity, such as
violence or vandalism. Id.
136
Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 379 n.31 (citing Douglas v. DynMcDermott
Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1998)).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. (quoting Douglas, 144 F.3d at 374).
140
Id.
141
WISE, supra note 120, at 19. Wise cites to the EEOC Compliance Manual § 8II(B)(3)(a); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1990); and EEOC v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983), as proponents of this approach.
Id. Because most courts do not require the employer to actually engage in unlawful
conduct, so long as the employee reasonably and in good faith believes she is opposing
an unlawful practice, Wise explains that the opposition letters can be protected even if
based on faulty allegations. Id.
142
720 F.2d 1008, 1011(9th Cir. 1983).
143
Id.
134

286

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:269

letter was disloyal, but noted that it was protected opposition
nevertheless.144 The Ninth Circuit opined:
Almost every form of “opposition to an unlawful employment
practice” is in some sense “disloyal” to the employer, since it
entails a disagreement with the employer’s views and a challenge
to the employer’s policies. . . . If discharge or other disciplinary
sanctions may be imposed based simply on “disloyal” conduct, it
is difficult to see what opposition would remain protected.145

2. Third Prong—Causation
Courts agree that the causal link between a protected activity and an
adverse employment decision could be established through direct or
circumstantial evidence.146 However, courts are split on what degree of
proof establishes causation.147 For example, the Fifth Circuit requires the
protected conduct to be the “but for cause” of the employment action.148
But other circuits require only that the “protected activity and the
negative employment action are not completely unrelated.”149
Temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse
action may be used as circumstantial evidence to prove or disprove
causation.150 The Supreme Court held in Clark County School Dist. v.
Breeden that temporal proximity may be used as the sole evidence of
causation if the period between the protected activity and the adverse
action is “very close.”151 This standard does not provide courts with
much guidance because the “very close” requirement is inherently
subjective. Consequently, lower courts often disagree about how much
144

Id. at 1014.
Id.; see also WISE, supra note 120, at 19. In discussing the Crown decision, Wise
criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s approach as being particularly unfair to employers. Id. Wise
writes: “[N]egative customer communications could be completely devastating to an
employer’s business. An employer cannot prohibit employees from engaging in this type
of communication nor can it punish employees from doing so, but it must somehow
counteract any negative public relations impact caused by the communication.” Id.
146
Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 379-80; see also WISE, supra note 120, at 28-29.
Wise explains that direct evidence may consist of any oral or written declaration
demonstrating that the employer took the adverse action as a result of the employee’s
protected activity. Id. However, circumstantial evidence “does not come directly from an
eyewitness or observer, or from actual documentation,” but rather requires the fact finder
to infer that a proposition is true from indirect evidence. Id. at 29.
147
Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 380.
148
Id. at 380 n.37 (quoting Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir.
1996)).
149
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir.
1993)).
150
Id. at 380.
151
532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001).
145
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temporal proximity or distance is sufficient.152 For example, the Third
Circuit has held that “‘temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the termination is sufficient to establish a causal link.’”153 Yet the
Eighth Circuit maintains that temporal proximity, by itself, does not
establish causation.154 In addition, this form of evidence is so subjective
that judges within the same circuit render conflicting decisions.155 For
example, one Fifth Circuit decision held that “a fourteen-month gap
between the filing of an initial bias charge with the EEOC and the
employee’s discharge did not disprove her retaliation claim.”156 But three
years later, the Fifth Circuit held that “a [fifteen-sixteen] month gap
between the filing of a workers’ compensation claim and discharge
‘militates against’ a finding of retaliation.”157
3. Second Prong—Adverse Employment Action
Prior to Burlington Northern, courts followed either the narrowview, broad-view or moderate-view definition of “adverse employment
action.”158 In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court adopted the
broad-view definition. Consequently, narrow-view circuits that relied on
their definition of an adverse employment action in declining to
recognize retaliatory harassment must now recognize this claim.
i. The Narrow View
According to the narrow view, an adverse employment action
consists of an ultimate employment decision that produces a “tangible
change in duties or working conditions” and results in a “material
employment disadvantage.”159 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits followed
this approach.160 According to these circuits, an ultimate employment
152

Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 380 (pointing out that uncertainty resulting from
courts’ conflicting decisions renders causation among the most litigated issues in
retaliation cases).
153
Id. (quoting Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)).
154
Id. (quoting Feltmann v. Seiben, 108 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997)).
155
Id.
156
Id. (quoting Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1992)).
157
Id. (quoting Burfield v. Brown, More & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 589 (5th Cir.
1995)).
158
Currie, supra note 7, at 1333.
159
Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
160
See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he verbal threat of being fired, the reprimand for not being at [the employee’s]
assigned station, a missed pay increase, and being placed on ‘final warning’ do not
constitute ‘adverse employment actions’ . . . .”); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no adverse employment action when a secretary
was transferred to a new, more stressful position with the same title, salary or
employment benefits, because it did not result in an economic disadvantage).
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action includes hiring, discharging, promoting, demoting, and granting or
denying compensation or reassignment.161 By contrast, an adverse
employment action does not include an interlocutory decision that may
tangentially effect an ultimate employment decision, such as a lateral
transfer,162 poor treatment by supervisors or co-workers,163 a verbal
reprimand and a missed pay raise.164
Narrow-view circuits relied on two main rationales to justify their
decisions. First, according to the policy rationale, allowing actions short
of ultimate employment decisions to predicate retaliation liability would
render the employer liable for any decision that “might jeopardize [the
plaintiff’s] employment in the future.”165 This could result in employer
liability for a wide variety of routine administrative actions that produce
no current material disadvantage.166 Second, The Fifth Circuit in Mattern
v. Eastman Kodak Co., explained the statutory-construction rationale.167
The Mattern court relied on the main discrimination provision for help in
interpreting the retaliation provision.168 The court compared subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the main discrimination provision, noting that (a)(1)
proscribes a definite set of harms, while (a)(2) is more vague and,
consequently, more broad.169 Specifically, the court noted that (a)(1)
makes it illegal for an employer to “‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.’”170 However, the court pointed out that (a)(2) prohibits an
employer from limiting an employee in ways “which deprive or ‘would
tend to deprive’ the employee of ‘opportunities’ or ‘adversely affect his
status’”171 The Mattern court concluded that because the retaliation
provision only mentions “discrimination,” as does subpart (a)(1), and
does not discuss the vague misconduct described in (a)(2), it must not
include the vague proscriptions of (a)(2).172 Thus, reading the retaliation
161

See cases cited supra note 160.
Harlston, 37 F. 3d at 382.
163
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992), aff’d 511 U.S.
244 (1994) (holding that co-workers’ hostility toward plaintiff and theft of her tools,
which gave the plaintiff anxiety, did not by itself constitute an adverse employment
action); see also Manning, 127 F.3d at 692-93.
164
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708.
165
Id.
166
Id.; see also Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382.
167
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708-09.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
171
Id. at 709 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2)).
172
Id.; see also Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 399. Cude and Steger note that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the language of § 2000e-2(a)(1) to include actions other
162
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provision consistently with subpart (a)(1), the court held that the
retaliation provision only applies to discrimination based on terms,
conditions or privileges of employment and other tangible harms.173
ii. The Broad View
Unlike the narrow view, this approach was promulgated by the
EEOC in 1998 in an attempt to clarify the scope of the retaliation
statute.174 According to the EEOC guidelines, an adverse employment
decision is any adverse action reasonably likely to discourage an
employee from participating in protected activity.175 The First, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits subscribe to this approach.176
These courts maintain that adverse employment actions can include
interlocutory decisions that do not immediately change the terms and
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.177 Examples of adverse
employment actions under this approach include bad references, poor
performance evaluations and negative remarks about an employee.178
This approach even includes actions that do not result in adverse
economic consequences, such as transferring an employee to a lateral
than ultimate employment decisions. Id. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
the Court rejected the view that “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” are
limited to tangible harms. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). However, Cude and Steger argue that §
2000e-2(a)(1) lends itself to a more expansive interpretation because it is modified by the
broad mandates of § 2000e-2(a)(2). Cude & Steger, supra note 24, at 396-99.
173
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708-09.
174
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL 8-13 to 815 (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf [hereinafter EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
175
Id.
176
Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding adverse
employment actions can include transfers of job responsibilities, undeserved performance
ratings, “lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and changes in work schedule”);
Gunnel v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding adverse
employment actions must be defined liberally and on a case-by-case basis); Widerman v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 141 F.3d 1453, 1456-67 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding adverse employment
actions include making employee work through his lunch break, assigning one-day
suspension, changing employee’s schedule without notifying him and expressing
negative remarks about employee); Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 119 F.3d 23,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding adverse employment action could include withdrawal of a
discretionary benefit, e.g., a severance package); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding adverse employment actions include “moving the person from a
spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available
support services . . . or cutting off challenging assignments.”); Wyatt v. City of Boston,
35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (adopting EEOC definition of adverse employment
action and construing it to include “disadvantageous transfers and assignments, refusals
to promote,” bad references and refusals to allow the choice of class curriculum).
177
See cases cited supra note 176.
178
See cases cited supra note 176.
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position, cutting off challenging assignments, relocating the employee
from a nice office to a dingy closet and changing the work schedule.179
The EEOC and the aforementioned circuits rationalize this standard
through policy and statutory construction. As a policy matter, these
courts feel that by focusing on the deterrent effects of an employment
action, this standard furthers the retaliation provision’s remedial
purpose.180 With respect to statutory construction, these courts maintain
that section 704(a)’s language “does not limit what type of
discrimination is covered, nor does it prescribe a minimum level of
severity for actionable discrimination.”181
iii. The Moderate View
Courts following the moderate view held that an adverse
employment action could be an ultimate employment decision or a
decision materially affecting employment privileges, conditions, terms or
compensation.182 The Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits followed
this approach.183 These circuits maintained that a reduction in job
responsibilities or professional status, a poor performance review, a
denial of salary and benefits, and other interlocutory employment
decisions could constitute adverse employment actions.184 Circuit courts
relying on this approach justified it as a compromise between two
opposite positions and argued that it was consistent with the main
discrimination provision’s language.185 In adopting this approach, the
179

See cases cited supra note 176.
See, e.g., Widerman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (“Permitting employers to discriminate
against an employee who files a charge of discrimination so long as the retaliatory
discrimination does not constitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle
employees’ willingness to file charges of discrimination.”).
181
Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
182
Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999).
183
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
limiting an employee’s job responsibilities, refusing to give him “a performance review
and annual salary and benefit increases” and giving references based on false information
can constitute adverse employment actions); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201
F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000) (modifying second prong of retaliation claim standard to
include adverse employment actions or “severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a
supervisor”); Richardson, 180 F.3d at 444 (holding that prison employee’s reassignment
to a different position that caused her to have contact with prisoners and changed her job
responsibilities qualified as adverse employment action even though she requested the
reassignment and “voluntarily accepted . . . the only position available at that time”);
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997).
184
See cases cited supra note 183.
185
Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866 (“‘[E]vidence that the terms, conditions or benefits of
employment were adversely effected’ is the cine qua non of an ‘adverse employment
action.’” (quoting Von Gunten v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 68 F. Supp. 2d 654, 662 (D. Md.
1999)).
180
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Fourth Circuit criticized the broad-view courts for contravening
legislative intent by interpreting the retaliation provision so broadly that
it provides more protection than the main discrimination provision.186
4. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court sided with the broadview circuits, holding that discrimination includes “materially adverse”
actions that “might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.’”187 The Court rejected the broad
and moderate-view circuits’ position that the adverse action must relate
to employment privileges, conditions, terms or compensation.188 The
Court, while extensively quoting the EEOC, reasoned that the retaliation
provision’s main purpose is to ensure that employees are not penalized
for engaging in protected activity.189 Ultimately, the Court explained that
employers could penalize employees through employment and nonemployment related actions; therefore, the latter are also prohibited under
the retaliation provision.190
V. TREATMENT OF RETALIATORY HARASSMENT UNDER THE THREE
VIEWS
Retaliatory harassment occurs when a supervisor or a co-worker
retaliates against an employee, who engaged in protected expression, by
creating a HWE. Much like HWE harassment under the main
discrimination provision, retaliatory harassment consists of actions that
do not produce tangible or economic harm. Retaliatory harassment can
take the form of name-calling, poor performance evaluations, pranks or
encouraging co-worker ostracism. Prior to Burlington Northern, various
broad-view and moderate-view circuits began to recognize retaliatory
harassment claims. These courts applied the legal standards developed
for HWE harassment under section 703(a) to this section 704(a) claim.
A. The Narrow View
Prior to Burlington Northern, the narrow-view circuits did not
recognize HWE harassment as an adverse employment action under the

186
Id. at 863 n.1 (“‘Congress has not expressed a stronger preference for preventing
retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for preventing actual discrimination under § 2000e-2’
. . . .” (quoting Ross v. Commc’n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985)).
187
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
188
Id. at 2414.
189
Id. at 2413-14.
190
Id.
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retaliation provision.191 These circuits did not differentiate between
supervisor and co-worker harassment.192 The Fifth Circuit addressed
retaliatory harassment for the first time in Mattern.193 There, the plaintiff
was a student in a mechanic’s apprenticeship program.194 She filed an
EEOC charge, claiming her supervisors created a HWE for her through
sexual harassment.195
The employer took corrective action by “allowing” one alleged
harasser to retire early and transferring the plaintiff to another crew.196
The plaintiff subsequently encountered the following difficulties at work:
(1) she told her supervisor that she needed to go home due to a workrelated sickness, he instructed her to report to the company medical
office, she refused and went home, so he came to her house to tell her to
report to the medical office; (2) she was disciplined for leaving her
designated work station; (3) she experienced hostility from co-workers,
who refused to say “hello” and allegedly stole tools from her locker; (4)
her doctor called her employer to discuss her work-related anxiety, but
the employer never returned her doctor’s phone call; and (5) she was
unable to complete an assignment and twice failed her Major Skills
Tests, which caused her supervisors to give her negative performance
evaluations and pass her over for a pay increase.197 The jury found
against the plaintiff on her HWE claim, because the employer satisfied
the affirmative defense by taking prompt corrective action.198 However,
the jury awarded her $50,000 in damages on her retaliation claim.199 The
Fifth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict on the retaliation claim.200 The
court held that supervisor or co-worker harassment constitutes an
interlocutory employment decision that may have a “mere tangential
effect on a possible future ultimate employment decision.”201 Thus, the
court concluded that such harassment was not actionable under section
704(a) as an adverse employment action.202
191
Manning v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692-93 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
supervisor’s disrespectful treatment and ostracism did not constitute adverse employment
action).
192
Id.; see also Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to recognize co-worker harassment as an adverse employment action).
193
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 702.
194
Id. at 703.
195
Id. at 704.
196
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B. The Broad View
Most broad-view circuits have expressly held that supervisor and
co-worker harassment can predicate liability under the retaliation
provision.203 The Seventh Circuit was among the first to recognize coworker harassment in Knox v. State of Indiana.204 The plaintiff in Knox
was a corrections officer who filed sexual harassment charges against her
captain.205 She alleged that her captain emailed her with various sexual
proposals and called her house to ask her out on a date.206 In response to
the plaintiff’s complaint, her employer demoted the captain.207 The
plaintiff alleged that because she caused the captain’s demotion, her coworkers subjected her to a HWE by gossiping about her to inmates and
other institutional workers.208
The plaintiff reported her co-workers’ conduct to an affirmative
action officer.209 However, the officer responded that she could not act
on the plaintiff’s complaint until the plaintiff provided her with specific
names of co-workers who were making the negative remarks.210
Subsequently, the plaintiff found out who the gossipers were and
reported them.211 In response, the affirmative action officer counseled all
four of them and recommended one for further disciplinary action.212
Nevertheless, the plaintiff filed suit against her employer for HWE
harassment and retaliatory harassment.213
The jury found in the employer’s favor on the HWE claim, but in
the plaintiff’s favor on the retaliation claim, awarding her $40,000.214 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury verdict.215 The court held
203

Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding coworkers’ ostracism and name-calling in retaliation for plaintiff’s filing a sexual
harassment complaint against their supervisor, which got him fired, was actionable
retaliation); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding supervisor’s
yelling at a male employee and taking away some of his privileges in response to his
complaints about treatment of female co-workers was actionable retaliation); Gunnell v.
Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding co-worker hostility
constituted an adverse employment action); Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding co-worker’s gossip about an employee who got her supervisor
demoted by filing sexual harassment charge was actionable retaliation).
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93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
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that co-worker gossip that is not directly addressed to the plaintiff could
constitute actionable retaliatory harassment.216 Additionally, the court
held that an employer is liable for co-worker retaliatory harassment “if
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and
failed to address the problem adequately.”217 In this case, the court
recognized that the employer took corrective action in response to the
plaintiff’s retaliation complaint.218 However, the court also deferred to
the jury’s finding that the employer’s corrective action was inadequate.219
The Seventh Circuit jumped through hoops to justify the jury’s
reasoning, stating that perhaps the affirmative action officer’s initial
request for the gossipers’ names was a “brush-off, motivated by the
trouble [the plaintiff’s] complaints had caused for the institution.”220
The Tenth Circuit was first to toy with the notion of applying the
HWE framework to retaliatory harassment claims. In Gunnell v. Utah
Valley State College, the Tenth Circuit held that co-worker harassment is
actionable retaliation only if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive.221 The
Gunnel court also held that employers could be liable for forms (2) and
(3) of co-worker harassment.222 Thereafter, the First and Ninth Circuits
expressly held that HWE law governs retaliatory harassment claims.223
C. The Moderate View
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the moderate-view circuits, held that
supervisor harassment constitutes an adverse employment action.224
These circuits maintained that supervisor harassment is actionable only if
216

Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1334.
218
Id. at 1335.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). Despite adopting this standard, the Gunnel
court did not analogize retaliatory harassment claims to HWE claims or expressly adopt
the HWE framework.
222
Id. at 1265 (“[A]n employer can only be liable for co-workers’ retaliatory
harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the
harassment or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to
condone and encourage the co-workers’ actions.”).
223
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[HWE] framework is
readily transferable to the retaliatory harassment context.”); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d
1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Harris and Faragher to determine whether
harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive”).
224
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 869-870 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Retaliatory
harassment can constitute an adverse employment action, but only if such harassment
adversely affects the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits of . . . employment.’” (citations
omitted)); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000)
(modifying the second prong of retaliation standard to include adverse employment
actions or “severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor”).
217
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it adversely affects the “terms, conditions, or benefits” of the plaintiff’s
employment.225 These circuits applied HWE harassment law to
retaliatory harassment claims.226 The Second Circuit recognized coworker harassment as actionable retaliation in Richardson v. New York
State Dep’t of Correctional Services.227 The Second Circuit also held that
HWE law governs co-worker retaliatory harassment claims.228
D. The Effect of Burlington Northern
While Burlington Northern did not specifically mention retaliatory
harassment, its broad definition of adverse employment action
encompasses this claim.229 All courts must now recognize retaliatory
harassment. However, Burlington Northern did not address whether
HWE harassment standards apply to retaliation claims. Consequently,
employers remain unguided on their liability for retaliatory harassment.
VI. USING HWE HARASSMENT LAW TO ADJUDICATE RETALIATORY
HARASSMENT CLAIMS MAKES IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT LIABILITY—A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED
Courts addressing the retaliatory harassment claim have not
addressed the practical consequences it imposes on American employers.
This comment argues that the application of HWE harassment principles
to retaliatory harassment claims creates confusion for employers seeking
to prevent liability. In addition, this approach allows litigants with weak
HWE harassment claims to bypass HWE harassment requirements.
Therefore, lower courts should develop a new standard for adjudicating
retaliatory harassment claims.
A. Applying HWE Law to Retaliatory Harassment Claims Confuses
Employers About Their Liability Under Title VII
The affirmative defense established in Ellerth and Faragher
requires employers to exercise “reasonable care to prevent and correct”
harassment.230 However, the employer cannot exercise reasonable care
until it discerns for which conduct it will be liable. Even without the
retaliatory harassment cause of action, an employer has a difficult time
measuring the bounds of its liability because of Title VII’s vague
225

See cases cited supra note 224.
See cases cited supra note 224.
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180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
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Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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language, the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the
consequent circuit splits on the HWE and retaliation standards. Since a
large employer cannot necessarily predict the state in which a plaintiff
will bring a Title VII claim against it, the employer must somehow
harmonize the circuits’ divergent Title VII standards and attempt to
prevent liability under all of them.
With respect to HWE harassment under section 703(a), an
employer does not receive clear guidance on what kind of conduct
constitutes sufficiently severe and pervasive hostility; whether it should
analyze such conduct from the viewpoint of a woman or a minority; and
whether it is relevant that its work culture is blue collar, as opposed to
white collar.231 With respect to retaliation under section 704(a), an
employer is left wondering whether an employee is protected for
reporting conduct that is perfectly lawful; whether it can punish a
disloyal employee who disrupts its business while claiming to oppose
unlawful action; and whether it can have retaliatory animus imputed to it
simply because it takes an adverse employment action against an
employee “shortly” after she engages in protected activity.232 By
applying HWE law to retaliatory harassment claims, courts combine the
circuit splits from both provisions into one cause of action, making it
more difficult than ever for an employer to assess and prevent Title VII
liability. Such decisions leave the employer confused about how to spot
protected conduct and what kind of supervisor or employee responses to
the protected conduct it must regulate.
To play it safe, an employer must regard any participation or
opposition activity as protected conduct, even where the employee
opposes an action that is perfectly lawful or conducts the opposition in a
disruptive manner.233 Once an employee engages in protected conduct,
the retaliatory harassment cause of action forces the employer to monitor
and regulate any subsequent offensive treatment that employee
encounters. Specifically, when HWE law is applied under the main
discrimination provision, an employer at least knows that it has to ferret
out offensive behavior that is sexually, racially, nationally or religiously
themed.234 Such behavior is not too difficult to spot. For example, sexbased HWE harassment may involve unwelcome remarks about a
231

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
234
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (explaining that section 703(a) only
applies to discriminatory practices that are based on protected characteristics); see also
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision in
Oncale, which held section 703(a)’s “because of” requirement safeguards against courts’
use of this section to impose a “general civility code”).
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plaintiff’s anatomy, sexually explicit jokes and photographs, or sexist
comments.235 Likewise race-based harassment may involve making
negative statements about a particular race or giving one race preferential
treatment.236
However, when HWE law is applied in the retaliation context, an
employer is liable for offensive conduct that may or may not involve a
retaliatory theme.237 For example, an employee may bring a retaliatory
harassment claim if her employer transfers her from a “brightly lit office
to a dingy closet,” gives her a bad reference or performance review, or
denies her a raise after she has engaged in protected expression.238 In
such a case, the employer’s conduct does not reference the plaintiff’s
protected expression and could be based on legitimate business reasons.
Further, according to Burlington Northern, the retaliatory harassment
does not even need to be employment related.239 Thus, in holding that an
adverse employment action is motivated by retaliation, courts often rely
on inferences.
The First Circuit acknowledged this point in Noviello v. City of
Boston.240 The court stated that finding retaliatory intent in retaliatory
harassment claims involves a “more nuanced” analysis than finding
discrimination based on protected characteristics in HWE harassment
claims.241 The court explained: “When dealing with discriminatory
harassment . . . there is seldom, if ever, a defensible purpose behind the
injurious actions. The only question is whether the bad acts, taken in the
aggregate, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable
harassment.”242 By contrast, the First Circuit noted that actions perceived
as retaliatory harassment can have numerous defensible purposes, such
as co-workers’ desires to defend the accused harasser.243 Having to
monitor any offensive behavior occurring after an employee engages in
protected expression is particularly troublesome for the blue-collar
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See, e.g., supra Part III (discussing various sexual harassment cases).
See, e.g., supra Part III (discussing various race-based harassment cases).
See supra Part VI.B.
238
See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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398 F.3d 76, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2005).
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Id. at 93.
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Id. at 92-93.
243
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ever more ambiguous list of factors that are supposed to inform the process of separating
permissible responses to the plaintiff’s protected activity from impermissible harassment.
See id. The factors include “the relative ubiquity of the retaliatory conduct, its severity,
its natural tendency to humiliate and, on occasion, physically threaten a reasonable
person, and its capacity to interfere with the plaintiff’s work performance.” Id.
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employer, whose workplace is permeated with vulgar expression.244
Under the HWE standard, a blue-collar employer may not be able to use
the nature of its work environment to prove that offensive expression
following protected activity was typical rather than retaliatory.
Another ambiguity presented by the retaliatory harassment claim is
whether an employer must judge sexually, racially or nationally themed
retaliation from the viewpoint of a woman or minority rather than a
reasonable person. This issue has not been addressed by the courts. In
Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court stated that retaliation must be
judged from the viewpoint of a “reasonable employee.” However, as
Justice Alito pointed out in his concurring opinion, “[t]he majority’s
conception of a reasonable worker is unclear. Although the majority first
states that its test is whether a ‘reasonable worker’ might well be
dissuaded, it later suggests that at least some individual characteristics of
the actual retaliation victim must be taken into account.”245
Even if an employer spots conduct that looks like retaliation, it has
to wonder whether the conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive.
Courts vary widely in their interpretations of this requirement under
section 703(a), and it is not clear that decisions based on section 703(a)
harassment are relevant in the section 704(a) context. It seems
unreasonable to equate the effects of sexist or racist expression on
particular employees to the effects of offensive expression on employees
who previously complained about “unlawful conduct.” For example, in
Ray v. Henderson the plaintiff’s supervisors called him “a ‘liar,’ a
‘troublemaker,’ and a ‘rabble rouser,’ and told him to ‘shut up’” after he
complained about their treatment of female employees.246 In applying the
HWE harassment case law to determine whether the plaintiff’s
supervisors engaged in sufficiently severe retaliatory harassment, the
Ninth Circuit noted that “[r]epeated derogatory or humiliating statements
244
245

Id.

246

Gross v. Burggraff, 53 F.3d 1531, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1995).
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito further explains:
The majority comments that “the significance of any given act of
retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances,” and
provides the following illustration: “A schedule change in an employee’s
work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter
enormously to a young mother with school age children.”
This illustration suggests that the majority’s test is not whether an act of
retaliation well might dissuade the average reasonable worker, putting aside
all individual characteristics of the actual victim. The majority’s illustration
introduces three individual characteristics: age, gender, and family
responsibilities. How many more individual characteristics a court or jury
may or must consider is unclear.
217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).
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. . . can constitute a [HWE].”247 To support that proposition, the Court
cited to a section 703(a) decision that found a HWE where “one
supervisor ‘repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made sexual remarks, and
requested sexual favors’ while another supervisor ‘frequently witnessed,
laughed at, or herself made these types of comments.’”248 The court
analogized the sexually vulgar remarks to the name-calling experienced
by the plaintiff in Ray, concluding that both types of derogatory
statements could constitute sufficiently severe harassment.249 The court
then reversed the lower court’s summary judgment order in the
defendant’s favor.250
The Ninth Circuit assumed that sexual vulgarities are analogous to
name-calling, such that both are subject to the same threshold of
“severity.” However, this assumption contradicts Title VII’s main
purpose, which lies in the recognition that a limited group of minorities
require extra protection from workplace discrimination.251 Title VII
acknowledges that such minorities have historically experienced adverse
treatment based on their characteristics that has made them sensitive to
certain conduct.252 The supervisor’s sexually vulgar comments were
severe to that plaintiff because, as a woman, she has a “greater physical
and social vulnerability to sexual coercion . . . [that can make her] wary
of sexual encounters.”253 However, the plaintiff in Ray was offended by
his supervisor’s comments simply because they were rude, not because
they reinforced a historical bias that he suffered through. The plaintiff in
Ray was not particularly sensitive to his supervisor’s name-calling, so it
is incorrect to posit that the names affected him in the same way that the
sexual vulgarities affected the woman.
B. Retaliatory Harassment Claims Allow Plaintiffs to Bypass HWE
Requirements
The retaliatory harassment claim makes it possible for a plaintiff
with a weak HWE claim to bypass the HWE harassment affirmative
defense, causation requirement, and “severe and pervasive” harassment
threshold. Once a plaintiff files suit under section 704(a), she attains the
status of “protected employee.”254 She can then bring a retaliatory
harassment claim against her employer for subsequent, offensive
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
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Id. at 1246.
See supra Part II.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991).
See supra Part IV.A.1.
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treatment she experiences from her supervisor or co-workers. The
employer may not be able to assert the Ellerth/Faragher defense in
response to a retaliatory harassment claim because some courts
recognizing retaliatory harassment do not discuss the availability of the
affirmative defense.255 Even if the defense is available, the First
Amendment may restrict an employer from regulating retaliatory
expression that is not facially discriminatory.256
Also, even if the employer successfully pleads the affirmative
defense proving that it exercised reasonable measures to prevent or
correct the HWE, the employee may still recover damages by showing
that the employer failed to prevent and correct subsequent negative
treatment that may be regarded as retaliation. For example, in Nye v.
Roberts, the plaintiff, a school psychologist, complained to the school
board that the principal had sexually harassed her.257 The school board
investigated her complaint, transferred her to a different school district at
her request, and ordered the principal to take a sexual harassment
seminar.258 Nevertheless, the plaintiff filed a HWE harassment claim
against her employer based on the principal’s alleged conduct and she
also notified the EEOC that the principal had allegedly harassed her coworker.259 The plaintiff’s co-worker denied she was ever harassed and
expressed her anger with the plaintiff in an affidavit.260 Consequently, the
plaintiff’s supervisor wrote her a letter of reprimand, criticizing her for
filing a fraudulent complaint on behalf of a co-worker who denied all
allegations asserted therein and for treating other co-workers poorly.261
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See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying
various aspects of HWE law to retaliatory harassment claim but omitting the affirmative
defense); see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). But see
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that employer
may raise the Ellerth affirmative defense in supervisor retaliatory harassment claims);
Morris. v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000).
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See generally Bernstein, supra note 72; Volokh, supra note 83; Eugene Volokh,
What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict, 85 GEO. L.J.
627, 627-33 (1997). Professors Bernstein and Volokh provide compelling analyses of the
conflict between HWE harassment law and the First Amendment. They argue that HWE
law is often unconstitutional, as applied, because it restricts protected workplace
expression. Although these articles discuss HWE law, they provide analyses that are
easily transferable to, and even more compelling in, the retaliatory harassment context. A
retaliatory harassment claim is a bigger threat to an employee’s First Amendment liberty
than a HWE claim, because the former prohibits an unrestricted spectrum of expression.
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The plaintiff responded by filing a retaliation claim against her
employer based on her supervisor’s letter.262 The Fourth Circuit upheld a
summary judgment in the defendant’s favor on the plaintiff’s HWE
claim, because the principal did not possess enough authority over the
plaintiff to impute his actions to the employer and the employer acted
reasonably to prevent and correct the alleged harassment.263 However,
the Fourth Circuit held that the employer could be liable for the
supervisor’s letter of reprimand and that the letter arguably contains
direct evidence of retaliatory animus, because it criticizes the plaintiff for
filing a fraudulent HWE harassment complaint on behalf of a coworker.264 Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s summary
judgment order on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, allowing it to go to
trial.265
The retaliatory harassment claim may also allow an employee to
bypass the “because of” and “severe and pervasive” requirements. For
example, in Clark County v. Breeden, the plaintiff brought a meritless
sexual harassment complaint against her employer based on her coworkers’ sexually themed discussion that was not directed at her or
intended to derogate any woman.266 Even though the court dismissed her
claim, she subsequently sued her employer for retaliation when she was
transferred to a position she did not like.267 The Ninth Circuit held that
even though her HWE claim lacked merit, she had a cognizable
retaliation claim.268 Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled that
decision.269
As explained in subsection (a), a retaliatory harassment claim is not
limited by a “because of” requirement that narrows the scope of
actionable expression.270 Therefore, the fact finder is free to scrutinize
any and all offensive behavior the plaintiff encounters after engaging in
protected activity. Even behavior that is not related to the plaintiff’s
employment is subject to scrutiny. The larger volume of evidence makes
a finding of “severe and pervasive” harassment more likely.271 Also,
262
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*3-5 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 1999).
268
Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564,
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broad-view courts apply HWE law’s “sufficiently severe and pervasive”
threshold in the context of a general policy that any adverse employment
decision is actionable retaliation if it is likely to discourage an employee
from participating in protected activity.272
Recently, the Supreme Court adopted this policy in Burlington
Northern. Neither the Supreme Court nor the broad-view courts have
clarified the relationship between these two standards. At least one
commentator argues that the “severe and pervasive” requirement must be
interpreted with greater laxity in the retaliatory harassment context,
because offensive behavior does not have to be so severe as to
discourage an employee from engaging in protected activity.273 To the
extent that courts allow this view to color their decisions, a litigant can
utilize a retaliatory harassment claim to bypass HWE law’s more
stringent “severe and pervasive” harassment threshold.
C. Courts Must Adopt a Clearer Standard for Adjudicating Retaliatory
Harassment Claims to Ease Employer Confusion
The practice of importing HWE harassment law into the retaliatory
harassment claim makes it virtually impossible for employers to assess
and prevent liability. This practice piles circuit splits on top of circuit
splits. Courts should enable employers to assert the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense to retaliatory harassment claims by providing clear
guidance on what constitutes protected conduct, an adverse employment
action and sufficient causation between the two. Narrow-view circuits
that must now recognize retaliatory harassment claims should formulate
a clearer retaliatory harassment standard rather than adopt the broadview and moderate-view circuits’ approach.

Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying HWE standard to
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